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为何只“小议”，因为目前所知不多，只能据目前有限所知小议之。
目前知道什么？ 首先网上有多处说翟天天被控为“恐怖分子”，此应为以讹传讹。文学城转国际在线报道说： “翟天天移民代表律师海明证实，警方在控告书中以“恐怖威胁”(Terroristic threat) 的罪名拘捕翟天天。起诉的理由是，当事人‘威胁(把学校) 烧为平地，漠视此等恐怖行为构成的危险’，警方解释翟天天的行为等同威胁犯罪，有目的地为公众构成严重的不便。 目前移民局已下了驱逐令，决定在这宗刑事案件完结后，将翟天天遣送回国。”
新泽西警方的控告书应是英文写的，国际在线转述英文的具体罪名为“Terroristic threat”，并转述海明律师透露的具体起诉理由，再考虑网上所说该案的一些特征，国际在线的说法显然可靠。
“Terroristic threat”和“terrorism”并无关联，被控“terroristic threat”的人即便最终被判有罪，离“恐怖分子”仍相去甚远。看到 “terroristic”就往恐怖主义联系会给人叫法盲的。
所谓 terroristic threat 其实也就是 criminal threatening。新泽西的有关法律条文如下：
2C:12-3. Terroristic threats
a. A person is guilty of a crime of the third degree if he threatens to commit any crime of violence with the purpose to terrorize another or to cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly, or facility of public transportation, or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience, or in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror or inconvenience. A violation of this subsection is a crime of the second degree if it occurs during a declared period of national, State or county emergency. The actor shall be strictly liable upon proof that the crime occurred, in fact, during a declared period of national, State or county emergency. It shall not be a defense that the actor did not know that there was a declared period of emergency at the time the crime occurred.
b. A person is guilty of a crime of the third degree if he threatens to kill another with the purpose to put him in imminent fear of death under circumstances reasonably causing the victim to believe the immediacy of the threat and the likelihood that it will be carried out.
新泽西把罪名分为五等，一、二等大致为传统观念里的“重罪”（felony），三、四等则为轻罪（misdemeanor)。 此外还有个等外，留给“disorderly persons”之类小鱼小虾。
“恐怖威胁”为三等，乃轻罪中较重的一种，从量刑角度讲，一般会判1至5年监禁，罚款上限$75,000。 但如在国家、州、或县紧急状态期间顶风作案，则为二等重罪，可判5至10年监禁。
也许有人会说，轻罪一桩，如何就弄到有可能被驱逐离境的地步？ 这个就和9/11有关了。9/11以后，美国通过了法律，规定在美的侨民所犯的罪如具有道德沦丧的性质（crime involving moral turpitude)，即可驱逐出境。
具体到翟天天的案子，假定他最终获罪，问题就是“恐怖威胁”是否构成“具有道德沦丧性质的罪”。
某项罪名是否涉及道德沦丧首先要看定义该罪名的法律条文。上引新泽西法律条文中有两个部分值得特别注意：“with the purpose to terrorize...” 和 “in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror...”。 (请注意，这第二个部分正是海明律师所说的“漠视此等恐怖行为构成的危险”。）
为什么说这两个部分特别值得注意，因为2004年美国联邦第八巡回上诉法院曾审结了一个案子，审结结果在很大程度上正是基于法院对相同的两段话的解释。在那个案子里，一个叫产穆尼的老挝人要求暂停对其执行驱逐令。但是移民法官认为他以前在明尼苏达曾因口角而动刀威胁对方。虽然他声称并非真要伤害对方，但承认有意恐吓对方，结果被判犯有恐怖威胁罪。
和新泽西的法律一样，明尼苏达有关恐怖威胁的法律也提到“with the purpose to terrorize...” 和 “in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror...”。 移民法官据此认为在明尼苏达被判有恐怖威胁罪即代表道德沦丧，驳回了产穆尼的要求。产穆尼上诉至联邦第八巡回上诉法院，上诉法院同意移民法官的解释，维持原判。
再回到翟天天的案子。
从上面的讨论就应该清楚，一旦真的因 “威胁(把学校) 烧为平地”而被判犯有恐怖威胁罪，翟天天十有八九会被驱逐，所以他目前只能寄希望于最终不会被判犯有此项涉及道德沦丧的罪名。
要证明翟天天有罪，检方必须证明三点： （1）翟天天确曾发出威胁，（2）威胁涉及实施暴力，（3）发出威胁是有意恐吓，或明知有恐吓到对方的可能而仍然为之。控辩双方都会集中在这三点上下功夫。
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附产穆尼一案的上诉法院判决书：
Chanmouny v. Ashcroft Keo CHANMOUNY, Petitioner, v. John ASHCROFT, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent. United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. Submitted: March 12, 2004. Filed: July 16, 2004. William E. Ford, argued, Hopkins, Minnesota, for petitioner. Susan K. Houser, argued, Washington, D.C. (Peter D. Keisler and Richard M. Evans, on the brief), for respondent. Before MURPHY, SMITH, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges. COLLOTON, Circuit Judge. 1 Keo Chanmouny, a native and citizen of Laos, petitions for review of the denial of his request for suspension of deportation. After finding that Chanmouny was removable as a non-immigrant who failed to maintain the conditions of his visas, an immigration judge ("IJ") further denied Chanmouny's request for suspension of deportation and voluntary departure because he had committed a crime involving moral turpitude. The Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") affirmed without opinion. After reviewing the decision of the IJ, see Palomino v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 942, 943-44 (8th Cir.2004), we deny Chanmouny's petition for review. 2 The Immigration and Naturalization Service instituted proceedings against Chanmouny on March 21, 1997. To avoid deportation, Chanmouny applied for suspension of deportation under the law in effect at the time of his application.1 An alien who is deportable may be granted suspension of deportation if the alien (1) has been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than seven years immediately preceding the date of such application, (2) proves that during such period he was and is a person of good moral character, and (3) is a person whose deportation would result in extreme hardship to the alien or to his spouse, parent, or child who is a citizen of the United States or a lawful permanent resident. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1994). 3 A person is not of "good moral character" if he or she is a member of the class of persons described in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A). 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(3) (1994). That class includes "any alien convicted of ... a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime[.]" 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i) (1994) (emphasis added). The IJ found that although Chanmouny established continuous physical presence and an extreme hardship to his child of United States citizenship if Chanmouny were deported, he was ineligible for suspension of deportation because he lacked good moral character. This finding was based on a 1996 conviction for terroristic threats under Minn.Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1, which the IJ deemed a crime involving moral turpitude. In his petition for review, Chanmouny contends that he was not convicted of a qualifying crime. 4 Congress has not defined the phrase "crime involving moral turpitude," and the meaning of that phrase was left "to future administrative and judicial interpretation." Franklin v. INS, 72 F.3d 571, 572 (8th Cir.1995) (quoting Cabral v. INS, 15 F.3d 193, 195 (1st Cir.1994)). In reviewing an administrative decision, therefore, we give deference to the agency's interpretation of the ambiguous statutory phrase, and we uphold its construction as long as it is reasonable. Id.; INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425, 119 S.Ct. 1439, 143 L.Ed.2d 590 (1999). 5 Over the years, the BIA has developed an analytical framework to determine whether an alien's conviction under a particular statute is a crime involving moral turpitude. First, the BIA has developed a general definition of the statutory phrase: 6 We have observed that the definition of a crime involving moral turpitude is nebulous. Moral turpitude refers generally to conduct which is inherently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to the accepted rules of morality and the duties owed between persons or to society in general. Moral turpitude has been defined as an act which is per se morally reprehensible and intrinsically wrong or malum in se, so it is the nature of the act itself and not the statutory prohibition of it which renders a crime one of moral turpitude. Among the tests to determine if a crime involves moral turpitude is whether the act is accompanied by a vicious motive or a corrupt mind. 7 In re Ajami, 22 I. & N. Dec. 949, 950 (BIA 1999) (internal citations omitted). 8 Second, the BIA has explained its methodology for examining a criminal conviction to determine whether the crime involved moral turpitude: 9 In deciding whether a crime involves moral turpitude, we must first examine the statute itself to determine whether the inherent nature of the crime involves moral turpitude. If the statute defines a crime in which moral turpitude necessarily inheres, then the conviction is for a crime involving moral turpitude for immigration purposes, and our analysis ends. However, if the statute contains some offenses which involve moral turpitude and others which do not, it is to be treated as a "divisible" statute, and we look to the record of conviction, meaning the indictment, plea, verdict, and sentence, to determine the offense of which the respondent was convicted. 10 Id. (internal citations omitted); see also In re Franklin, 20 I. & N. Dec. 867, 868-69 (BIA 1994), aff'd, 72 F.3d 571 (8th Cir.1995). 11 The Minnesota statute under which Chanmouny was convicted provides, in part, that "[w]hoever threatens, directly or indirectly, to commit any crime of violence with purpose to terrorize another ... or in a reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror ... may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both." Minn.Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1.2 As such, the statute provides for conviction based on at least two different mental states — "purpose to terrorize" and "reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror." Id. 12 In considering Chanmouny's case, the IJ analyzed the statute as follows: 13 Looking at the statute at issue here it is clear that a threat to commit a crime of violence is the starting point. The purpose of the threat is to terrorize another person. The Court believes strongly that this is the type of base and depraved behavior that invokes the issues of moral turpitude. The statute on its face deals with an individual threatening violence against another person to terrorize them. The Court does not believe that this is really a divisible statute, considering that [Chanmouny] was convicted under that specific statutory language. See, the complaint in the criminal case at page 14 of Exhibit 11. 14 (Admin. R. at 50). 15 Even where an administrative decision embodies "less than ideal clarity," we may uphold the decision "if the agency's path may reasonably be discerned." Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285-86, 95 S.Ct. 438, 42 L.Ed.2d 447 (1974). At first glance, it is not entirely clear from the IJ's analysis whether the IJ reached his conclusion on the ground that the "statute defines a crime in which moral turpitude necessarily inheres," Ajami, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 950, or, alternatively, that the statute contains some offenses that involve moral turpitude and others that do not, but that Chanmouny's violation did involve a crime of moral turpitude. On the one hand, the IJ said he did "not believe that this is really a divisible statute," suggesting perhaps that moral turpitude is inherent in all violations. At the same time, however, the IJ observed that the statute requires that "the purpose of the threat is to terrorize another person," and that Chanmouny was "convicted under that specific statutory language." The latter statements, together with citation of the record of conviction in Chanmouny's criminal case, lead us to conclude that the IJ treated the overall statute as potentially divisible, but concluded from the record of conviction that Chanmouny was convicted of acting with a "purpose to terrorize," rather than "reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror." Having discerned the IJ's path, we must evaluate whether the agency's decision should be upheld. 16 Chanmouny argues that the Minnesota statute is divisible, that he was convicted based on the mental state of "recklessness," and that violations committed with that mental state do not constitute crimes of moral turpitude. We need not enter the thicket of determining whether the recklessness prong of the Minnesota statute implicates a crime of moral turpitude, cf. Franklin, 72 F.3d at 572-73; In re Fualaau, 21 I. & N. Dec. 475, 478 (BIA 1996), because we conclude that even assuming the statute is divisible, the record of Chanmouny's conviction shows that he was convicted of acting with "the purpose to terrorize," and that his violation was a crime of moral turpitude. 17 Where a criminal statute is divisible for purposes of the moral turpitude statute, the BIA looks to the record of conviction to determine whether the petitioner was convicted under the part of the statute that implicates moral turpitude. Ajami, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 950. The record of conviction typically includes the indictment or information, plea, verdict or judgment, and sentence. Id. We have held that an IJ is authorized to consider such records of conviction in determining deportability under a different section of the immigration statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(C), for a conviction involving the use of a firearm. Vue v. INS, 92 F.3d 696, 700 (8th Cir.1996). Similarly, we agree with other circuits that the record of conviction may be reviewed to determine whether an alien was convicted of a crime of moral turpitude under a divisible statute. See Wadman v. INS, 329 F.2d 812, 814 (9th Cir.1964) (quoted in Vue, 92 F.3d at 700); Smalley v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 332, 336 (5th Cir.2003). 18 The IJ in this case received the record of Chanmouny's criminal conviction into the administrative record at the removal proceeding, and specifically cited the criminal complaint in the decision on suspension of deportation. The mens rea element in Chanmouny's criminal complaint was alleged in the alternative: "Chanmouny did threaten to commit a crime of violence with the purpose of terrorizing another, and/or in reckless disregard of the risk of causing terror in another[.]" (Admin. R. at 281). The complete record of conviction, however, demonstrates that the IJ was correct to conclude that Chanmouny was convicted of making threats with the purpose of terrorizing another. The factual allegations of the criminal complaint allege such a purpose by recounting that Chanmouny "admits holding a meat cleaver up by his shoulder to scare" the victim. (Admin. R. at 281). And the transcript of Chanmouny's colloquy with the court at his guilty plea establishes that he admitted the element of making threats with the purpose of terrorizing another: 19 Q: And at that time you got into an argument with [complainant]? 20 A: Yes. 21 Q: And you got from the kitchen a meat cleaver? 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: And while you were yelling at her, you had the meat cleaver in your hand? 24 A: Yes, Your Honor. 25 Q: And it was your intention to scare her with that meat cleaver? 26 A: Yes. 27 Q: But you didn't intend to actually hurt her? 28 A: No. 29 Q: And you agree that would be a threat, the way you were working things? 30 A: Yes. 31 ... 32 Q: You agree that you did this to terrorize her? 33 A: Yes. 34 (Admin. R. at 239-40) (emphases added). 35 Chanmouny does not dispute that the transcript of the guilty plea hearing may be considered as part of the record of conviction, see, e.g., Tokatly v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 613, 620 (9th Cir.2004), but contends that his responses were "ambiguous and conflicting." We disagree. His admissions that "it was [his] intention to scare her" with the meat cleaver, and "[he] did this to terrorize her" make clear that Chanmouny was convicted for making threats "with purpose to terrorize," rather than acting merely with reckless disregard for the consequences of his actions. 36 Having established that Chanmouny was convicted of threatening to commit a crime of violence with the purpose to terrorize another, we uphold the IJ's conclusion that the offense "is the type of base and depraved behavior that invokes the issues of moral turpitude." (Admin. R. at 50). We are guided in our analysis by the Minnesota Supreme Court's interpretation of the phrase "purpose to terrorize" in the terroristic threat statute. In State v. Schweppe, 306 Minn. 395, 237 N.W.2d 609 (1975), the court explained that "[p]urpose in this context means aim, objective or intention" and "[t]errorize means to cause extreme fear by use of violence or threats." Id. at 614. 37 We previously have approved the BIA's longstanding general definition of "crime of moral turpitude," Franklin, 72 F.3d at 573, which includes acts accompanied by "a vicious motive or a corrupt mind." Ajami, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 950. The BIA, in a case involving the offense of aggravated stalking, has held that "the intentional transmission of threats is evidence of a vicious motive or a corrupt mind." Id. at 952. We agree with that conclusion, and although aggravated stalking required the defendant to engage in a "course of conduct, as opposed to a single act," id., we do not see a material distinction between the two for purposes of determining whether a defendant acted with vicious motive. We believe that the crime at issue in this case — threatening a crime of violence against another person with the purpose of causing extreme fear — likewise falls within the category of offenses requiring a vicious motive or evil intent. This requisite intent to terrorize also serves to distinguish Chanmouny's offense from simple assault, which the BIA and various courts have declined to classify as a crime of moral turpitude. Simple assault typically is a general intent crime, and it is thus different in character from those offenses that involve "a vicious motive, corrupt mind, or evil intent." See Matter of O____, 3 I. & N. Dec. 193, 194-95 (BIA 1948). 38 Chanmouny contends that not every offense involving an evil intent or vicious motive is a crime of moral turpitude. See Rodriguez-Herrera v. INS, 52 F.3d 238, 241 (9th Cir.1995). The Ninth Circuit thought that the crime of "malicious mischief" under Washington law — which could lead to conviction for destroying as little as $250 of another's property with an "evil wish to annoy" — involved an evil intent that was too attenuated from the character of the offense to establish a crime of moral turpitude. Id. Assuming that to be correct, we agree with the IJ that a violation of the Minnesota terroristic threat statute committed with the purpose to terrorize involves a more serious offense, and includes the requisite depravity and breach of duties owed between persons to satisfy the moral turpitude standard. 39 For the foregoing reasons, we deny the petition for review. Notes: 1 "Suspension of deportation" was a form of relief from deportation prior to the passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA"), Pub.L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-546 (1996). Section 308(b)(7) of IIRIRA eliminated "suspension of deportation," and Section 304 created a new form of relief known as "cancellation of removal." Because Chanmouny's proceedings were initiated prior to the effective date of IIRIRA, suspension of deportation was the type of relief potentially available to him at that time, and we have jurisdiction under the IIRIRA transitional rules to review the denial of relief. IIRIRA § 309(c)(4);see also Ikenokwalu-White v. INS, 316 F.3d 798, 801, 803 (8th Cir.2003). 2 A "crime of violence" includes, among others, the offenses of murder, manslaughter, and first, second, and third degree assaultSee Minn.Stat. § 609.1095, subd. 1(d). | 
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